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ABSTRACT 
One of the key principles of EU Competition law is a prohibition of the abuse of a 
dominant position established in the Article 102 of the TFEU. Predatory pricing is one of the 
forms of the abuse of dominant position. To decide whether the dominant undertaking has 
referred to predatory pricing it is necessary to check several elements: costs and prices of the 
dominant undertaking; the possibility to recoup losses; intent; and objective justifications. The 
Court of Justice, the European Commission and competition institutions in most member states 
perform extensive analysis of a relationship between costs and prices of a dominant 
undertaking while dealing with cases on predatory pricing. However, we believe that 
competition authorities should pay more attention to evaluation and to whether pricing will 
cause elimination of competitors and damage to consumers. This article critically reviews the 
framework of the analysis of predatory pricing in the practice of the Court of Justice and the 
European Commission. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From 1890, the courts of the United States began to deal with predatory pricing 
cases. State institutions of the US especially aimed to protect small undertakings 
from the establishment of low prices by the dominant undertakings. To recognize the 
actions of the dominant undertaking as illegal, it was necessary to establish 
‘predatory’ settlement of low prices and damage to competitors.1 Scholars usually do 
not try to estimate the beneficial effect of low prices for undertakings and 
competition. Although claimants won most of the cases concerning predatory pricing, 
several legal scholars have concluded that the accusations of claimants in many cases 
were not well grounded.2 This period is sometimes called the era of populist actions 
against predation.3 During that period, the courts of the United States and legal 
scholars did not manage to create any clear system that would allow evaluating 
whether certain pricing amounts to predation.4 
Many lawyers and economists have tried to describe the concept of ‘predatory 
pricing’, but a common agreement on the content of this term has not reached.5 A 
commission claims that dominant undertaking engages in predatory conduct by 
deliberately incurring losses or foregoing profits in the short-term, to foreclose or be 
likely to foreclose one or more of its real or potential competitors with a view to 
strengthening or maintaining its market power, thereby causing the consumer harm.6 
R. A. Posner proposes to define predation as pricing actions of a dominant 
undertaking that aim to remove the effective competitor from the market.7 R. H. 
Koller claims that predation is a situation in which a large and financially powerful 
undertaking establishes prices that do not cover costs to eliminate smaller 
competitors and monopolize the relevant market. To remain competitive a smaller 
                                         
1 Carla A. Hills, Antitrust Advisor (New York, 1978), 312–313; Austin Cyrus, Price discrimination and 
related problems under the Robinson-Patman act, Revised edition (Committee on Continuing Legal 
Education, 1954), 46-47; Christine Piette Durrance, “Proposed standards for identifying predation: 
Williamson’s perspective and the Court,” The Antitrust Bulletin Vol. 55, No. 3 (2010). 
2 Richard H. Koller, “The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study,” Antitrust Law and Economic 
Review Vol. 4 (1971): 105. From 1890 until 1971 year, 123 federal cases related to predatory pricing have 
been investigated in US. Predatory pricing was proved in 95 cases, or otherwise in 75 percent of all the 
cases. 
3 Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley, and Michael H. Riordan, “Predatory Pricing: Strategy Theory and Legal 
Policy,” Georgetown Law Journal Vol. 88 (2000); Paul Jones, “Analyzing Refusal-to-Deal Cases Under 
Brooke Group's Predatory Pricing Test: The Tenth Circuit Misses the Mark in Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer 
Valley Resort Co.,” Brigham Young University Law Review No. 1 (2010). 
4 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (in this case regional reduction of prices was 
recognized as illegal, without provision of clear rules, how such actions should be analyzed); See also, 
United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1991) (it was established that pricing below costs 
contradicts to section of the Sherman Act, but it was not explained how predatory pricing is to be 
analyzed). 
5 Vijaya Nagarajan, “Predatory pricing: A search for a regulatory standard,” Working paper series No. 31 
(1987) (Kingswood, N.S.W., Nepean College of Advanced Education, School of Business): 2. 
6 Communication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (2009/C 45/02), 
para. 63. 
7 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law. An economic Perspective (University of Chicago Press, 1976), 189. 
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undertaking might be forced to cut prices and sell at a loss.8 Since the dominant 
undertaking has substantial financial resources, smaller undertakings might be 
eliminated from the market. After the elimination of competitors, the dominant 
undertaking may start to exploit consumers, which must pay a higher price.9 Ahlborn 
C. and Allan B. distinguish three core elements that they believe are common to all 
predatory pricing definitions. First, the predator behaves in a way which, in the short 
run, is not optimal and which is only rational strategically, by reason of reduced 
competition in the future; second, the behaviour reduces competition; third, the 
predator benefits from the reduction in competition in the long run through added 
market power.10 
The definitions of predatory pricing provided in judicial practice and 
jurisprudence are quite similar. We propose the following definition: predatory pricing 
occurs when the dominant undertaking sets prices lower than the costs of production 
and excludes competitors or creates additional barriers for new competitors to enter 
the market and subsequently establishes high prices, which could not have been 
established without the exclusion of the competitors (or creation of additional 
barriers), thus causing damage to the consumers. 
Usually the Court of Justice focuses on analysis of four key elements in 
predatory pricing instead of focusing on application of a concept of predatory pricing 
to the circumstances of the case. Firstly, it analyses whether the price of the products 
covers all the costs. There are different cost benchmarks: average variable costs, 
average avoidable costs, average total costs and long run average incremental costs. 
Secondly, it analyses whether the dominant undertaking by establishment of low 
prices intends to eliminate competitors from the market, to increase its share in the 
market. Thirdly, it analyses whether the actions of the alleged predator may exclude 
competitors from the market and whether dominant undertaking will be able to 
recoup experienced losses. Fourthly, it analyses whether the predator may justify 
illegal actions by providing objective justifications. In this article, we will focus on the 
abovementioned main elements of predatory pricing, since they are analysed in the 
cases on predation. 
This article is structured in accordance with the analysis of the main elements 
of predatory pricing. Section II covers the main goals of competition law. Section III 
focuses on pricing below costs. Section IV discusses predatory intent. Section V 
focuses on recoupment of losses. Section VI is devoted to objective justifications. 
Section VII provides conclusions. 
                                         
8 Richard H. Koller, Predatory pricing in a market economy (New York: Arno Press, 1978), 4. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Christian Ahlborn and Bill Allan, “The Napp Case: A study of predation?” World Competition Vol. 26(2) 
(2003). 
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In the article, we aim to identify and critically evaluate the framework of the 
analysis of predatory pricing used by the Commission, the General Court and the 
Court of Justice. We also provide some proposals concerning the potential 
modification of the attitude of the Commission, the General Court and the Court of 
Justice towards predatory pricing. 
1. THE MAIN GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW AND THE PROHIBITION OF 
PREDATORY PRICING 
Protection of consumers is one of the main goals of competition law.11 The 
European Commission proposes to focus the enforcement of Article 102 of the TFEU 
on the evaluation of whether actions of the dominant undertaking negatively affect 
the market and hurt consumers.12 It is recognized that Article 102 should protect 
consumers and ensure effective distribution of the resources instead of simply 
protecting all the competitors. The Communication of the Commission “Guidance on 
the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings” stipulates that while 
applying Article 102 to exclusionary actions of dominant undertakings, the 
Commission will focus on the conduct that is most harmful to consumers.13 The 
Commission aims to direct its enforcement towards ensuring that the market 
functions properly and consumers benefit from the efficiency. At the same time the 
Commission believes there is a direct link between protection of the competitors and 
protection of the consumers, claiming that dominant undertakings should be 
prohibited from hampering competitors’ activities and harming consumers as a 
result.14 The Commission believes that effective competition in the market is ensured 
by “efficient” competitors, i.e. hypothetical competitors that have the same costs as 
the dominant company.15 The Commission does not aim to protect all competitors 
and it is acceptable that the competitors who deliver less to the consumers in terms 
of price, choice, quality and innovation, may leave the market. 16  Although the 
Commission pays a lot of attention to the protection of consumers, it does not explain 
how to determine whether consumers experience loses when competitors are 
                                         
11 Raimundas Moisejevas and Ana Novosad, “Some thoughts concerning the main goals of competition 
law,” Jurisprudencija. No. 20(2) (2013): 630. 
12 Neelie Kroes (European Commissioner for Competition Policy), “Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review 
of Article 82,” Speech at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, New York (September 23, 2005) // 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-537_en.htm?locale=en. Antitrust: Consumer Welfare 
at Heart of Commission Fight Against Abuses by Dominant Undertakings, Brussels: 3rd December 2008, 
IP/08/1877. 
13 European Commission, DG Competition, “DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 
82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses” (December 2005) // http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ 
competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf. 
14 Communication from the Commission, supra note 6, para 19. 
15 European Commission, DG Competition, supra note 13: para 63. 
16 Ibid., para 6. 
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expelled from the market. Most likely the Commission relies on the presumption that 
actions of the dominant undertaking, which help to eliminate “efficient” competitors, 
cause damage to the competition and thus also cause damage to the consumers. 
While analysing the decisions of the Commission, it is not clear whether the 
Commission intends to determine the real effect of the actions of the undertakings 
for the consumers and the market. Former head of the Directorate General for 
Competition P. Lowe has noted that it is quite difficult to determine the effect to the 
market, which has been caused by the dominant undertakings. Therefore, according 
to P. Lowe, in cases related to application of the Article 102, it is necessary to rely 
on formal criteria.17 In our opinion, P. Lowe’s position does not correspond to the 
official aspiration of the Commission to direct main attention to the evaluation of the 
effect that the dominant undertakings caused to the consumers and the market.18 
In the practice of the Court of Justice and the General Court, there is a lack of 
consistency as well. In Österreichische Postsparkasse AG and GlaxoSmithKline cases, 
the General Court has named the welfare of the consumers the main goal of 
competition law.19 Moreover, President of the General Court declared in paragraph 
145 of the IMS Health Inc. case that the Commission gratuitously established a link 
between effective competition and the interests of the particular competitors. The 
President of the General Court claimed that the primary purpose of Article 102 is to 
prevent the distortion of competition, and, especially, to safeguard the interests of 
consumers rather than simply protect the position of particular competitors. 20 
However, during appeal proceedings the President of the Court of Justice stated that 
the reasoning of the General Court provided in paragraph 145 cannot be accepted 
without reservation, i.e. it should not be understood as excluding the interests of 
competing undertakings from the aim pursued by Article 102. The President of the 
Court of Justice held that interests of competitors cannot be separated from the 
maintenance of an effective competition structure.21 Therefore, although the General 
Court recognized protection of the consumers as the main aim of the Article 102, the 
Court of Justice in the appeal decision in a parallel manner emphasized protection of 
the interests of the competitors. 
                                         
17 Philip Lowe (Director General, EC Commission Directorate-General for Competition), “Consumer Welfare 
and Efficiency – New Guiding Principles of Competition Policy?” 13th International Conference on 
Competition and 14th European Competition Day, Munich (March 27, 2007). 
18 Neelie Kroes, supra note 12. 
19 Österreichische Postsparkasse AG and Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG v. Commission of the European 
Communities, Joined cases T-231/01 and T-214/01 [2006], para. 115; GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited 
v. Commission of the European Communities, Case T-168/01 [2006], para. 171. 
20 IMS Health Inc., v. Commission of the European Communities, T-184/01 R, Order of the President of 
the Court of First Instance [2001], para. 145. 
21 NDC Health GmbH & Co KG and NDC Health Corporation v. Commission of the European Communities, 
C-481/01, Order of the President of the Court [2002], para. 84. 
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In Continental Can and British Airways cases the Court of Justice stated that 
the Article 102 prohibits not only actions of the dominant undertakings, which directly 
harm consumers, but also such actions that harm consumers through negative 
impact on an effective competition structure.22 In the France Telecom case the 
General Court dismissed the argument made by the Wanadoo Company that the 
pricing policy of Wanadoo did not cause any damage to consumers and even was 
beneficial to them. The Court claimed that the competition law protects the structure 
of the market from false distortions, since in such case the interests of the consumers 
are safeguarded in a best way. According to the Court, it is not necessary to prove 
that certain behaviour causes direct negative effect to the consumers.23 Analysis of 
the practice of the Court of Justice and the Commission does not allow clearly 
identifying one dominant goal of the EU competition law.  
The EU judicial institutions emphasize the need to protect effective competition, 
the competitors and the consumers.24 It seems that practically the Court of Justice 
focuses on an evaluation of whether dominant undertakings cause damage to 
competition and competitors, instead of evaluating whether the consumers have 
suffered any damage. The Court of Justice should focus on the question whether the 
actions of the dominant undertaking caused any damage to the consumers. Such 
evaluation should be done instead of raising the question of whether the dominant 
undertaking damaged competitors and consequently hampered “effective 
competition structure”. We believe that only actions which may affect the wealth of 
the consumers consequently, should be recognized as detrimental to “effective 
competition structure”. In case actions of the dominant undertaking do not cause 
damage to the consumers, then, despite the effect on the competitors, we should not 
recognize that the structure of the market is damaged.25 It is necessary for the Court 
of Justice and the Commission to formulate a consistent approach to how the damage 
caused to the consumers might be established.26 
From a practical point of view, it is important to evaluate the negative economic 
effect of the actions of the dominant undertakings and harm caused to the 
                                         
22 British Airways v. plc Commission of the European Communities. Case C-95/04 [2007], para. 106; 
Europemballage Corpn and Continental Can v. Commission of the European Communities, Case C-6/72 
[1973], para. 26. 
23 France Télécom v. Commission, Case T – 340/03, para. 266; British Airways plc v. Commission of the 
European Communities, Case T-219/99 [2003], para. 264. 
24 Eugene Buttigieg, “Consumer Interests and the Antitrust Approach to Abusive Practices by Dominant 
Firms,” European Business Law Review Vol. 16, No. 5 (2005). 
25 Such position is supported by several legal scholars – Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, The Law 
and Economics of Article 82 EC (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), para. 221; John Vickers, “Abuse of Market 
Power,” Economic Journal Vol. 115, No. 504 (2005); Howard H. Chang, David S. Evans, and Richard 
Schmalensee, “Has the Consumer Harm Standard Lost Its Teeth?” AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working 
Paper; MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4263-02 (August 13, 2002) // https://ssrn.com/abstract=332021; 
EAGCP, “An economic approach to Article 82” (July 2005) // 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/studies/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf. 
26 The need to reconsider the current approach to the predatory pricing is also discussed in Einer R. 
Elhauge, “Defining Better Monopolization Standards,” Stanford Law Review (2003). 
Brought to you by | Mykolas Romeris University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/25/19 10:14 AM
BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS  ISSN 2029-0454 
VOLUME 10, NUMBER 1  2017 
 
 131 
consumers. Ignoring the abovementioned criteria may result in controversial 
decisions of the competition institutions and the courts.27 In predatory pricing cases 
damage to the consumers will appear only if the dominant undertaking may recoup 
losses. Without actual recoupment of the losses taking place, only competitors may 
experience the damage. Consequently, if protection of the consumers is recognized 
as the main goal of the competition law, then recoupment of losses should be 
recognized as a necessary constituent element of predatory pricing. Therefore, 
predatory pricing should be viewed as illegal only if it is possible to prove recoupment 
of losses. At the same time, we should bear in mind that Article 102 is not a part of 
consumer protection law; thus, to establish breach of Article 102, it is also necessary 
to prove restriction of competition when legality of exclusionary abuse is assessed.28 
Therefore, the competition authority has to prove that damage to consumers has 
been caused by the illegal restriction of competition.29 
2. PRICING BELOW COSTS 
2.1. AVERAGE VARIABLE COSTS TEST 
Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner proposed the first test for analysis of 
predatory pricing on the basis of  costs. 30  Areeda and Turner claimed that 
undertakings engage in predatory pricing quite rarely, therefore rules which prohibit 
such actions should be very clear and should not deter undertakings from legitimate 
pricing.31 The scholars noted that price which is higher than average variable costs 
should be legal and the price which is lower than average variable costs should be 
illegal.32 Nowadays competition institutions mostly follow the proposal of Areeda and 
Turner and do not refer to marginal costs.33 
Scientific theory of Turner and Areeda received wide recognition in the courts 
of the United States.34 The Court of Justice relied on this test in the first case on 
                                         
27 Kati Cseres. “The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard,” The Competition Law Review No. 
2 (2007). 
28 Michelin v. Commission of the European Communities, Case T-203/01 [2003], para. 237; Microsoft Corp 
v. Commission of the European Communities, Case T-201/04 [2007], para. 867. 
29 Pinar Akman, “'Consumer Welfare' and Article 82EC: Practice and Rhetoric,” CCP Working Paper No. 08-
25 (July 31, 2008) // https://ssrn.com/abstract=1210802. 
30 Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, “Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act,” Harvard Law Review Vol. 88, No. 4 (1975). 
31 Ibid.: 699. Raimundas Moisejevas, Ana Novosad, Virginijus Bitė. “Cost benchmarks as criterion for 
evaluation of predatory pricing.” Jurisprudencija. No. 19(2) (2012): 587. 
32 Ibid.: 733. 
33 International Competition Network, “Report on Predatory Pricing”: 10 // 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc354.pdf. 
34 Wesley J. Liebeler, “Whither predatory pricing? From Areeda and Turner to Matsushita,” Notre Dame 
Law Review (1986): 1052; Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 943 (1982); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
1074 (1977); International Air Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). 
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predatory pricing in the EU – AKZO Chemie BV as well as in Tetra Pak and France 
Telecom cases.35  
We could make some critical notes in relation to the Areeda-Turner test.36 
Firstly, establishment of prices higher than average variable costs sometimes is 
predatory.37 Secondly, average variable costs test is beneficial for the undertakings 
which have high fixed and small variable costs, for example to those who operate in 
the sectors of transport and software. In these sectors, even in the case of 
establishment of small prices, they will be higher than average variable costs.38 
Thirdly, it is more important to understand economic factors of the market than to 
analyse average variable costs. 
2.2. AVERAGE AVOIDABLE COSTS TEST 
William Baumol proposed to use average avoidable costs test  instead of the 
test of Areeda-Turner.39 This test was used by the European Commission in Deutsche 
Post AG case,40 the Competition Council of Canada Commissioner of Competition v. 
Air Canada case, the US appeal court in United States v. AMR Corp. case41 and by a 
number of competition councils from the other member states.42 Average avoidable 
cost is the average per unit cost that the alleged predator would have avoided during 
the period of below-cost pricing had it not produced the predatory increment of 
sales.43  
We should point out a number of limitations for the use of the average avoidable 
test. Firstly, the average variable costs test has the same drawbacks as the average 
avoidable costs. Secondly, in certain cases the benchmark of the average avoidable 
costs will be higher than the benchmark of the average variable costs. Thus, in such 
cases it is easier to prove that the undertaking engaged in predatory pricing.44 
                                         
35 AKZO Chemie BV v. EU Commission, Case C – 62/86 [1991]; Tetra Pak International SA v. EU 
Commission, Case C – 333/94 [1996], para. 41; France Télécom, Case T-340/03, supra note 23, para. 
130. 
36 Raimundas Moisejevas, Ana Novosad, Virginijus Bitė, supra note 31: 588. 
37 James Hurwitz and William Kovacic, “Judicial analysis of predation: the emerging trends,” Vanderbilt 
Law Review Vol. 35 (1982): 106. 
38 Ibid.: 588. 
39 William J. Baumol, “Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test,” Journal of Law and 
Economics Vol. 39, No. 1 (1996). 
40 Deutsche Post AG, Decision of the European Commission of March 20, 2001, OJ L 125/27. 
41 Commissioner of Competition v. Air Canada, Canadian Competition Tribunal (2003), 26 C.P.R. (4th) 476 
[2003] C.C.T.D. No. 9; United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003). See William J. Baumol, 
supra note 39. Average avoidable costs test was mentioned in legal literature from 1981: Janusz Ordover 
and Robert Willig, “An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation,” Yale Law Journal 
Vol. 91, No. 1 (1981): 17-18. 
42 Average avoidable costs test is applied in Brazil, Canada, EU, Chile, France, Germany, Ireland, Jamaica, 
New Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States. See: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/unilateral_conduct/FINALPredatoryPricing
PDF.pdf (at 10). Raimundas Moisejevas, Ana Novosad, Virginijus Bitė, supra note 31: 588. 
43 Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley, and Michael H. Riordan, supra note 3: 2271. 
44 Raimundas Moisejevas, Ana Novosad, Virginijus Bitė, supra note 31: 592. 
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Thirdly, desire of the Commission to use the average avoidable costs does not 
correspond to the practice of the Court of Justice. 
2.3. LONG-RUN AVERAGE INCREMENTAL COSTS 
A long-run average incremental cost is the average of all the costs that are  
incurred to produce a particular product.45 The Commission in the Deutsche Post case 
admitted that the undertaking, which produces several goods will not be recognized 
as a predator if its income covers incremental costs of provision of certain service.46  
The Commission indicates two situations when establishment of prices lower 
than long-run average incremental costs means predation. Firstly, it might be the 
case if certain business is a monopoly.47 Secondly, it also might be the case if specific 
costs relate to sectors that were liberalized recently or in which liberalization is in 
progress, for example, the telecom sector.48 
Some scholars greeted the decision of the Commission in the Deutsche Post 
case to use incremental costs instead of average variable costs. 49  Long-run 
incremental costs test is suitable for industries in which undertakings experience high 
fixed costs and produce many goods.50 Average variable costs test is beneficial for 
the undertakings, which act in industries that require a lot of investment and when 
variable costs are close to zero. 51  However, we believe that long-run average 
incremental costs test is not universal and should be applied only to some 
businesses.52 
 
                                         
45 European Commission, DG Competition, supra note 13: para. 64. 
46 Deutsche Post AG, supra note 40, para. 10. Long-run average incremental costs are also used by the 
Competition institutions in Brazil, Denmark, EU, France, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Russia, South Africa, 
Taiwan and United Kingdom. See: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/unilateral_conduct/FINALPredatoryPricing
PDF.pdf (at 9). Raimundas Moisejevas, Ana Novosad, Virginijus Bitė supra note 31: 592. 
47 Deutsche Post AG, supra note 40, para 27. See also: Notice on the application of the competition rules 
to the postal sector and on the assessment of certain State measures relating to postal services, European 
Commission, OJ C 39, 06.02.1998; see also: Notice on the application of competition rules to access 
agreements in the telecommunications sector – framework, relevant markets and principles, OJ C 265, 
22.08.1998. 
48 Ibid., para. 110-115. Raimundas Moisejevas, Ana Novosad, Virginijus Bitė supra note 31: 592.  
49 Cyril Ritter, “Does the law on predatory pricing and cross-subsidization need a radical rethink?” World 
Competition Vol. 27, No. 4 (2004): 622. 
50 Paul A. Grout, “Recent Developments in Definitions of Abusive Pricing in European Competition Policy,” 
CMPO Working Paper Series No. 00/23 (2000) (University of Bristol); Paul Joskow and Alvin A. Klevorick, 
“Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy,” Yale Law Journal Vol. 89, No. 2 (1979). 
51 Temple Lang, “European Community Antitrust Law: innovation markets and high technology industries,” 
Fordham International Law Journal Vol. 20 (1996); see also Access Notice by the EU Commission, which 
recognize that AKZO test may be not suitable for the telecommunications sector: Notice on the application 
of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector, European Commission 
OJ C 265/2 [1998], para. 113-115. 
52 Raimundas Moisejevas, Ana Novosad, Virginijus Bitė, supra note 31: 594. 
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2.4. PRICES HIGHER THAN AVERAGE AVOIDABLE COSTS AND SMALLER 
THAN AVERAGE TOTAL COSTS 
While a dominant undertaking has no reason to establish prices below average 
avoidable costs, since such prices do not maximize profit, it may have found 
reasonable establishment of prices above average avoidable cost but below average 
total cost.53 Average total costs are calculated by dividing total costs (fixed and 
variable costs) by many produced goods.54 Recently the Court of Justice in Post 
Danmark case confirmed that prices below average total costs, but above average 
variable costs, must be regarded as illegal only if additional evidence on intent to 
eliminate competitors is present.55 Such position of the Court is widely supported.56 
We believe that it is possible to apply average total cost test only if special 
circumstances are present, since in this case variable and part of fixed costs are 
covered, and pricing of the undertaking does not accrue as many losses as 
establishment of prices, which are smaller than average variable/average avoidable 
costs. 
2.5. PRICES HIGHER THAN AVERAGE TOTAL COSTS 
Establishment of prices higher than average total costs normally does not 
amount to predatory pricing. Usually, such pricing eliminates only less effective 
competitors and is illegal only if there are exceptional circumstances, which show 
that consumers experience disadvantage.57 
Firstly, establishment of prices higher than average total costs amounts to 
predatory pricing when undertakings in a collective dominant position apply strategy 
to eliminate certain undertaking and reduce its revenue, propose to certain clients’ 
goods/services for a price lower than relevant undertaking, and mutually share losses 
which are experienced because of detrimental trade.58 The Compagnie Maritime 
Belge case serves as example, when the Court of Justice prohibited any ‘collective 
exclusion or marginalization’, since the dominant liner conference proposed to the 
                                         
53 European Commission, DG Competition, supra note 13: para. 111. 
54 Raimundas Moisejevas, Ana Novosad, Virginijus Bitė, supra note 31: 594. 
55 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet, Case C-209/10 [2012], para. 17. 
56 Former Head of the General Directorate for Competition Philip Lowe supports this position. Philip Lowe, 
“EU competition practice on predatory pricing,” Introductory address to the Seminar ‘Pros and Cons of Low 
Prices’, Stockholm (December 5, 2003) // 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2003_066_en.pdf. For example, Professor 
Robert O‘Donoghue, who is against prohibition of prices higher than average costs, points out that situation 
may be different if evidence on intent to eliminate competitor is submitted. Robert O’Donoghue, “Over-
Regulating Lower Prices: Time for a Rethink on Pricing Abuses under Article 82 EC”; in: Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu, eds., European Competition Law Annual 2003: What is an abuse of a 
dominant position? (Oxford and Portland: Hart publishing, 2006). 
57 European Commission, DG Competition, supra note 13: para. 127. 
58 Ibid., para. 128. Raimundas Moisejevas, Ana Novosad, Virginijus Bitė, supra note 31: 596. 
Brought to you by | Mykolas Romeris University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/25/19 10:14 AM
BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS  ISSN 2029-0454 
VOLUME 10, NUMBER 1  2017 
 
 135 
most important buyers of a competitor services for a low price in order to match the 
pricing of the competitor.59 
Secondly, the Commission proposed to recognise the establishment of prices 
higher than average total costs as predation when the dominant undertaking has 
unique advantages or acts in the market where economies of scale are very 
important, and entrants to the market initially will have to operate at a significant 
cost disadvantage.60 
We believe prices higher than average total costs should not be treated as 
predation. Most competition institutions from different countries recognize that 
pricing above average total costs does not constitute predation.61 Prohibition to apply 
prices higher than average total costs may deter the dominant undertaking from 
competing effectively and cause appearance of ineffective competitors. Thus, 
prohibition of such pricing would not be beneficial for consumers.62 
3. PREDATORY INTENT 
The judicial institutions of the European Union recognise the intent of the 
dominant undertaking as an important element in predation cases.63 The significance 
of the intent of the dominant undertaking in specific case depends on the relationship 
between costs and price.64 In case the undertaking establishes price smaller than 
average variable/avoidable costs, the presumption of predatory pricing and illegal 
intent is made. However, in case undertaking sets prices higher than average 
variable/avoidable costs, then to recognise predation it is necessary to prove illegal 
intent of the undertaking.65 Judicial institutions of the European Union do not admit 
                                         
59 Compagnie Maritime Belge SA (C-395/96 P) and Dafra-Lines A/S (C-396/96 P) v. EU Commission 
[2000]; lowering of prices to eliminate certain competitor from specific airlines was prohibited in Lufthansa 
case, decision 2002-02-18, B9-144/01, German Bundeskartellamt. 
60 European Commission, DG Competition, supra note 13: para. 129. 
61 Establishment of prices higher than average total costs in not recognized as predation in Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Czech, Denmark, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, South Africa, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. Only in 
exceptional circumstances such type of pricing is recognized as predation in Germany and Russia. See: 
http://www.international-
competitionnetwork.org/media/library/unilateral_conduct/FINALPredatoryPricingPDF.pdf (at 9). 
62 Raimundas Moisejevas, Ana Novosad, Virginijus Bitė, supra note 31: 598. 
63 Dustin Sharpes, “Reintroducing intent into predatory pricing law,” Emory law journal Vol. 61 (2012): 
903. While considering predatory pricing, big importance is devoted to intent in Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway, Peru, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey and UK. Small importance to intent is devoted in 
Hungary, Italy, Jamaica, Russia, South Africa and US. However, in Italy intent is important to determine 
size of the fine. See: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/unilateral_conduct/FINALPredatoryPricing
PDF.pdf (at 24). 
64 Raimundas Moisejevas, “The importance of the intent in predatory pricing cases” Jurisprudencija. No. 
4(122) (2010): 321. 
65 France Télécom, Case T – 340/03, supra note 23, para. 197. 
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that dominant undertaking referred to predatory pricing only based on the evidence 
of illegal intent.66 
In the US intention is not viewed as important while evaluating the actions of 
the dominant undertakings.67 In the US, intention is not given primary importance, 
partly because the evidence concerning the intent of the undertaking might easily 
misguide the jury differently from judges.68 
Some scholars notice that managers of the undertakings have a better 
opportunity than officials of the competition councils to evaluate profitability of 
predatory pricing and the extent to which it may distort competition.69 
The Court of Justice emphasized importance of the intent of dominant 
undertaking in 1978 in the United Brands case.70 The Court of Justice held s that in 
certain cases intention to eliminate competitor is the decisive factor for recognition 
of predation.71 The Court of Justice claimed that if undertaking sets prices higher 
than average variable costs and smaller than average total costs the undertaking has 
an opportunity to eliminate even effective competitors without experiencing losses.72 
In AKZO case the Court of Justice recognized that the selective nature of the setting 
of the prices smaller than average total costs and higher than average variable prices 
witnesses that AKZO intended to eliminate a competitor from the market.73 
When the undertaking establishes prices lower than average variable costs and 
intent to eliminate competitors is established, then we should allow the undertaking 
to justify its pricing.74 Sometimes the undertaking may justify the motives of its 
behaviour. We should also aim to evaluate the ability of undertaking to recoup 
                                         
66 Almost all competition institutions in the world take the position that it is not sufficient to provide 
evidence concerning illegal intent of undertaking to prove that undertaking was engage in predatory 
pricing. See: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/unilateral_conduct/FINALPredatoryPricing
PDF.pdf (at 25). 
67 United States v. Grinnell Corporation, 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966). Richard Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. 
(University of Chicago Press, 2001), 214. 
68 Moisejevas Raimundas, supra note 64: 321. United States v. Microsoft Corporation, 253 F3d 34, 54 
(D.C. Circ.) (2001); also, Aspen Skiing Co. v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603, 86 L. Ed. 
2d 467, 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985). 
69 Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 64: 321. Irwin M. Steizer, “Changing Antitrust Standard”, Remarks 
before the Workshop on Antitrust Issues in Today's Economy, the Conference Board, New York (March 5, 
1987): 5. 
70 United Brands v. Commission, Case C - 27/76 [1978], para. 189. 
71 AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, supra note 38, para. 71 - 72; Irish Sugar v. Commission, Case T-
228/97 [1999], para. 111. 
72 Ibid., para. 72. 
73 Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 64: 322. Ibid., para. 113–115. 
74 Ridyard Derek, “Exclusionary pricing and price discrimination abuses under Article 82: An economic 
analysis,” European Competition Law Review Vol. 23 (2002): 296. 
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losses.75 The dominant undertaking may justify its actions76 although   Article 102 
TFEU has no exemption similar to paragraph 3 of Article 101 TFEU.77  
In Tetra Pak II facts of the case (long term of the unprofitable sales, durability 
of abuse and data of the accounting) allowed recognizing that dominant undertaking 
was intentionally experiencing losses and selling products cheaper than their costs of 
production in certain regions (prices were even 50 percent lower than in other 
regions). 78 
In Wanadoo case79, the Commission claimed that it is possible to indicate an 
intention based on the facts of the case even without having direct evidence on 
elimination of the competitor.80 We believe that the Commission should  have paid 
more attention to the pricing effect on the market of the dominant undertaking. 
Evaluation of the intention of the dominant undertaking and analysis of the effect of 
the undertaking’s actions is completely different. Moreover, in Wanadoo case the 
Commission has not paid enough attention to justifications based on the learning 
effects, economy of scale and the ability to recoup losses.81 
The Court of Justice claims that for recognition of the abuse it is not necessary 
to prove negative effect of the actions of the dominant undertaking. The Court 
believes that it sufficient proving potential negative effect of the actions of the 
dominant undertaking.82 The General Court held that for the recognition of abuse it 
is sufficient if showing illegal intent of the undertaking.83 
The Court recognized close connection between the effect and intent of the 
dominant undertaking, 84  but failed to explain the means for the practical 
                                         
75 Tetra Pak International SA v. EU Commission, Case C – 333/94 [1996], para. 44. The ECJ held that it 
is not necessary to provide evidence that it is practically possible to recoup losses. However, in Wanadoo 
case Commission researched whether recoupment is possible. Wanadoo case, European Commission 
decision delivered on July 16, 2003, No, COMP 38.233, Commission press release lP/03/1025. Also, take 
a look to Phillip Lowe, “Monopolization versus abuse of dominant position,” Panel discussion statement, 
Fordham Competition Law Institute (2004). 
76 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ, 2000, C 291/1, para. 141; Luc Gyselen, “Rebates: Competition on 
the merits or exclusionary practice?”; in: Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu, eds., European 
Competition Law Annual 2003 What is an Abuse of a Dominant Position? (Hart Publishing, 2006); Lowe 
Phillip, “DG Competition's Review of the Policy on Abuse of Dominance,” Fordham Competition Law 
Institute (2004). 
77 Tetra Pak v. Commission, Case T-51/89 [1990], para. 27; BPB Industries and British Gypsum, Case T-
65/89 [1993], para. 75; Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reiseburo GmbH v. Zentrale zur 
Bekdmpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs e. V., Case C-66/68 [1989]; Compagnie Maritime Belge, supra note 
59, para. 135. 
78 Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 64: 323. Tetra Pak International SA, Case C – 333/94, supra note 
87. 
79 Wanadoo case, European Commission decision, supra note 75. 
80 Ibid., para. 271. 
81 Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 64: 325. Antonio Bavasso, “The role of intent under article 82 EC: 
from ‘flushing the turkeys’ to spotting lionesses in Regent‘s park,” European Competition Law Review Vol. 
26(11) (2005). 
82 British Airways v. Commission, Case T-219/99 [2003], supra note 23, para. 293. 
83 Thomas Eilmansberger, “How to distinguish good from bad competition under article 82 EC: In search 
of clearer and more coherent standards for anti-competitive abuses,” Common Market Law Review No. 42 
(2005): 147. 
84 Eleanor M. Fox, “Monopolization and dominance in the United States and the European Community: 
Efficiency, opportunity, and fairness,” Notre Dame Law Review No. 981 (1986): 1001. 
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determination of illegal intent. However, we do not agree with a position of the  Court 
that dominant undertaking aiming to  eliminate competitors necessarily has enough 
instruments for the real elimination of the competitor.85  
We could summarize our critical attitude towards the practice of the Court of 
Justice in a couple of points. Firstly, the undertaking may aim to eliminate 
competitors, but most of such goals fail. Example of Aberdeen Journal’s case shows 
that86 undertakings may wrongly believe that by engaging in predatory pricing, they 
will be able to distort competition. It was held in Aberdeen Journal’s case that the 
Aberdeen Journal’s company used to apply prices smaller than average total costs 
and that Aberdeen Journals company intended to eliminate Independent company 
from the market. Aberdeen Journals Company was fined for the abuse. Competition 
authority paid a lot of attention to the intent of the Aberdeen Journals company, 
although it failed to implement illegal plan and there was no real danger to exclude 
the competitor.87 In case a real effect on the market and ability to recoup losses was 
evaluated, then different outcome of the case could have been possible. 
Secondly, many undertakings like to claim internally aim to eliminate 
competitors and it is hard to draw a clear line when such statement becomes illegal.88 
Thirdly, officers of competition institutions should devote interest not to the 
intent of undertaking, but to the research whether the pricing of dominant 
undertaking will lead to the elimination of competitors. We believe that only distortion 
of the competition should be taken into account recognizing abuse.89 
4. RECOUPMENT OF LOSSES 
4.1. RECOUPMENT OF LOSSES IN PREDATION CASES 
The Court of Justice recognized that to prove predation, it is not necessary to 
establish that undertaking may recoup losses. In Tetra Pak case the Court of Justice 
noted that: 
Furthermore, it would not be appropriate, in the circumstances of the present 
case, to require in addition proof that Tetra Pak had a realistic chance of recouping 
its losses. It must be possible to penalize predatory pricing whenever there is a 
                                         
85 Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 64: 326. 
86 Predation by Aberdeen Journals Limited, Case No. CA98/14/2002, September 16, 2002, Decision of the 
Director General of Fair Trading. 
87 Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 64: 326. 
88 Robert O’Donoghue, supra note 25; A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 
1401-02 (7th Cir. 1989); Damien Geradin and Robert O‘Donoghue, “The Concurrent Application of 
Competition Law and Regulation: The Case of Margin Squeeze Abuses in the Telecommunications Sector,” 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics (2005); “Comments of Professor Elhauge on DG Competition 
Discussion Paper on Exclusionary Abuses” // 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/contributions.html. 
89 Robert O’Donoghue, supra note 25. 
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risk that competitors will be eliminated (…) The aim pursued, which is to maintain 
undistorted competition, rules out waiting until such a strategy leads to the actual 
elimination of competitors.90 
Advocate General Fennelly in Compagnie Maritime Belge case noted that to 
prove that undertaking referred to predatory pricing, it is necessary to prove that 
undertaking might recoup losses.91 Advocate General believed that the actions of the 
predatory undertaking would cause damage to competition only if after elimination 
of competitors undertaking establishes high prices that are unfavourable to the 
consumers. On the other hand, elimination of competitors itself, without setting high 
prices allowing to recoup losses does not distort competition.92 Since the Court of 
Justice has expressed it opposition to the attitude of the Advocate General some 
scholars thought that the Court left an open question for the future discussion of the 
importance to recover losses.93 
In France Telecom SA case, the General Court decided that recoupment of 
losses is not necessary in predation.94 Wanadoo Company claimed that it had no 
possibility to recoup losses and therefore it has not used predatory pricing.95 The 
General Court dismissed necessity to prove recoupment. The Court declared that it 
is sufficient to prove prices of the undertaking were smaller than average variable 
costs and the undertaking aimed to abuse dominance.96 
It is interesting to note that in the analysis of the appeal claim Advocate General 
Mazak wrote that it is necessary to prove that the dominant undertaking is able to 
recoup losses.97  
We may also refer to AKZO case which declared that a dominant undertaking 
has no interest to establish prices below average variable costs except that of 
eliminating competitors to enable it subsequently to raise its prices by taking 
advantage of its monopolistic position, since each sale generates a loss, namely the 
total amount of the fixed costs.98 The Court recognizes that undertaking refers to 
predatory pricing, because it expects to recoup losses later (gain some profit). 
Moreover, it is provided in Hoffmann-La Roche case99 that the concept of abuse is an 
                                         
90 Tetra Pak International SA, Case C – 333/94, supra note 75, para. 41, 42, 44. 
91 Compagnie Maritime Belge SA (C-395/96 P) and Dafra-Lines v. Commission, Opinion of Advocate 
General Fennelly delivered on October 29, 1998, Joined cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96, para. 136. 
92 Raimundas Moisejevas, “Recoupment of losses by the dominant undertaking, which allegedly have used 
predatory pricing and legality of actions,” Jurisprudencija No. 2(120) (2010): 291. 
93 Miguel de la Mano and Benoît Durand, “A Three-Step Structured Rule of Reason to Assess Predation 
under Article 82,” Office of the Chief Economist Discussion Paper (December 12, 2005): 27 // 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/pred_art82.pdf. 
94 France Télécom, Case T – 340/03, supra note 23. 
95 Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 113: 292. 
96 France Télécom, Case T – 340/03, supra note 23, para. 227–228. 
97 France Telecom SA v. Commission, Case C-202/07, Opinion of Advocate General Mazák delivered on 
September 25, 2008. 
98 AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, supra note 35, para. 71 
99 Hoffman-La Roche v. Commission, Case C – 85/76 [1979], para. 91 
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objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position, 
which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very 
presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and 
which, through recourse to methods different from those which condition normal 
competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial 
operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition 
still existing in the market or the growth of that competition.100 
The Commission claims that undertaking while abusing dominant position 
distorts competition. However, restriction of competition and recoupment of losses is 
related. We believe, that the Court should recognize that consumers suffer damage 
only if an undertaking may recoup losses. Advocate General was critical towards 
Commissions’ argument that dominant position guarantees the ability to recoup 
losses and argued that to recognize the company dominant the present market 
structure is valued and to determine the ability of undertaking to recoup losses it is 
necessary to evaluate future changes of the market.101 
However, in France Telecom SA decision on the 2nd of April 2009 the Court of 
Justice did not modify its practice and held that proof on the ability to recoup losses 
does not constitute a necessary precondition to recognizing pricing policy as 
abusive.102 This decision ended discussion whether under the EU competition law it 
is necessary to prove ability of the predator to recoup losses. We believe that this 
decision of the Court lacks legal reasoning. We presume that one of causes why the 
Commission refuses to evaluate recoupment is Commissions’ intention to protect not 
only consumers, but also competitors. On the other hand, in some specific cases 
(related with mergers and not abuse of dominant position) Commission pays 
attention to recoupment.103 
4.2. THE ABILITY OF THE DOMINANT UNDERTAKING TO RECOVER 
LOSSES 
The Commission believes that when an undertaking is dominant, it also follows 
that entry barriers are high enough and such undertaking can recoup losses.104 High 
entry and re-entry barriers prevent competitors from entering or re-entering the 
                                         
100 Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 92: 292. 
101 France Telecom SA v. Commission, Case C-202/07, supra note 97, para. 76. 
102 Ibid., para. 76. 
103 Boeing / Lockheed Martin / United Launch Alliance JV Case No. IV/M.3856, European Commission 
decision delivered on August 9, 2005, recognizing that concentration is compatible with common market 
on the basis of Council Regulation No. 4064/89, para. 27–36. 
104  European Commission, DG Competition, supra note 13; Tommy Pettersson and Stefan Perván 
Lindeborg, “Comments on a Swedish case on predatory pricing – particularly on recoupment,” European 
Competition Law Review Vol. 22 (2001); Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley, and Michael H. Riordan, supra 
note 3: 2265; Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 US 209, 222–24 (1993). 
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market, and the predating undertaking will be able to increase its prices.105 According 
to the Commission the dominant position itself guarantees the ability to recoup 
losses. We are not able to fully agree with such statement because of the reasons 
provided below. 
The Discussion paper prepared by the European Commission Directorate 
General Office of the Chief Economist named “A three-step structured rule of reason 
to assess predation under article 82” contradicts official doctrine of the Commission 
and provides that the dominance is not sufficient to recoup losses and is not a 
necessary condition for the recovery of losses.106 The Discussion paper provides that 
the ability to recover losses does not follow directly from the dominance. To 
determine whether the undertaking occupies a dominant position the market power 
before the actions of predation is evaluated. However, the market power before the 
predation does not supply information about the increase of the market power in the 
subsequent period.107 The dominant undertaking may only recover losses if, after the 
elimination of competitors, its market power will increase substantially. 108  The 
recoupment happens if after the elimination of competitors the profit is higher than 
the foregone revenue. On the other hand, the profit depends on the changes in 
market power after the exclusion of competitors. Therefore, an evaluation of the 
dominance before predation is insufficient for conclusion whether the undertaking 
may use the increase of the market power and recoup losses. The ability to recoup 
also depends on the expenses incurred for the elimination of the competitors. Such 
expenses could not have been evaluated during the prior establishment of the 
dominant position. If during predation the dominant undertaking incurs considerable 
expenses, then the amount of losses to be recovered automatically rises as well. 
Thus, dominance itself does not guarantee ability to recoup losses.109 
On the other hand, it is not necessary for the undertaking to be dominant to 
recoup losses, since an undertaking through predation in the market where it is not 
dominant may create a “tough” reputation and deter potential competitors from 
entering the market.110 Predation in a small market dramatically decreases the 
                                         
105 Paul Joskow and Alvin Klevoric, supra note 50; Janusz Ordover and Robert Willig, supra note 41: 10–
13. There are also some authors who believe that the element of recoupment is not important in predatory 
pricing case. See for example – Christopher R. Leslie, “Predatory pricing and recoupment,” Columbia Law 
Review Vol. 113, No. 7 (2013). 
106 Miguel de la Mano and Benoît Durand, supra note 93. 
107 Ibid.: 28. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 92: 293. 
110 David Kreps and Robert Wilson Robert, “Reputation and Imperfect Information,” Journal of Economic 
Theory Vol. 27 (1982): 253; Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, “Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence,” 
Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 27, No. 2 (1982): 280; Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley, and Michael H. 
Riordan, supra note 3: 2239. National competition institutions of Canada, Chile, France, Jamaica, Peru, 
UK, USA, Mexico, Italy and Ireland recognize that undertaking might recoup losses in other product or 
geographical market than that in which predatory pricing was applied. See: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/unilateral_conduct/FINALPredatoryPricing
PDF.pdf (at 19). 
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amount of losses incurred (the predator at the same time deters competitors from 
the entrance to bigger markets in which a predator operates).111 
A dominant position is not the main key element necessary for predation. The 
ability to fill the market, to satisfy the increase in demand and reduce prices of the 
products are more important than having a dominant position. C. Newton also 
believes that the competition authorities should pay more attention to the financial 
capacities of the undertaking and less to its market share.112 Sometimes dominant 
undertakings may even experience higher losses than other undertakings, since low 
prices will be applied to a huge number of products. Moreover, the ability of a 
dominant company to enhance profits through increase of market share is quite 
limited. At the same time, an undertaking that is not dominant, may apply predatory 
pricing to abuse its dominant position in the future (which might increase 
substantially) and recoup the losses.113 
The courts should recognize that dominant undertaking predated only if there 
is evidence that dominant undertaking may recover losses.114 Firstly, damage to 
consumers occurs only if dominant undertaking recovers losses. If recoupment is 
recognized as a necessary element, competition institutions should inquire whether 
dominant undertakings’ actions caused damage to consumers. Secondly, if 
recoupment were recognized as a necessary element, competition institutions would 
evaluate real effect of dominant undertakings’ actions. Thirdly, Commission 
incorrectly concludes that high entry barriers guarantee the ability of dominant 
undertaking to recoup losses, since the evaluation of entry barriers and dominant 
position provide information concerning the existing structure of the market and not 
about future changes in market structure that might occur after predation. Fourthly, 
if recoupment is not considered, competition law rules may be applied very strictly 
and dominant undertakings will refrain from establishment of low prices that are 
beneficial for consumers. 
5. OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATIONS 
5.1. MEETING COMPETITION DEFENCE 
Competitions institutions in most countries of the world recognize that it is 
possible to justify the establishment of prices lower than costs based on the meeting 
                                         
111 Miguel de la Mano and Benoît Durand, supra note 93. 
112 Carl Newton, “Do predators need to be dominant?” European Competition Law Review Vol. 20 (1999): 
127. Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 92: 300. 
113 Ibid.: 300 
114 Emmanuel Mastromanolis, “Predatory Pricing Strategies in the European Union: A Case for Legal 
Reform,” European Competition Law Review Vol. 19 (1998); Valentine Korah, An Introductory Guide to EC 
Competition Law and Practice (Hart Publishing, 2000). 
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competition defence.115 Many scholars believe position that dominant undertaking 
may refer to meeting competition defence if undertaking sets price, which is smaller 
than average total costs and higher than average avoidable costs.116 The meeting 
competition defence appeared for the first time in the United States.117 
In the Hilti case, the Commission recognized the meeting competition 
defence.118 The meeting competition defence also was recognized in AKZO case.119 
The establishment of small prices based on a meeting competition defence should be 
proportional and fit for the actual circumstances.120 
We regret that in the practice of the Court of Justice, the content of the meeting 
competition defence is interpreted ambiguously and the dominant undertakings face 
some lack of legal certainty.121 
In 1997, Commission took informal decision in Digital Undertaking case in which 
Commission affirmed obligations of the dominant undertaking previously accused of 
abuse of dominant position.122 Digital company aiming to resolve the case peacefully 
took obligation to ensure that all reduced prices will be higher than average total 
costs 123 . Digital reserved right to lower prices in response to competition but 
undertook obligation that such reduction will be proportional and will not disturb 
competition.124 
                                         
115 For example, in Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, Mexico, New Zealand, South Afrika, US and 
the EU. See: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/unilateral_conduct/FINALPredatoryPricing
PDF.pdf (at 28); Raimundas Moisejevas, “Objective justification in predatory pricing,” Jurisprudencija. No. 
18(1) (2011): 218. 
116 Such a position is taken by Ulrich Springer, “Meeting Competition: Justification of Price Discrimination 
Under EC and US Antitrust Law,” European Competition Law Review (1997): 255; Moritz Lorenz, Maike 
Lübbig, and Alexia Russel, “Price Discrimination, a Tender Story,” European Competition Law Review 
(2005): 359; Robert O’Donoghue, supra note 56: 390; with this position disagrees Michael Waelbroeck, 
“Meeting Competition: Is This a Valid Defence for a Firm in a Dominant Position?”: 489; in: A. Giuffrè, ed., 
Divenire sociale e adeguamento del diritto: Studi in honore di Francesco Capotorti (1999). 
117 Paul Andrews, “Is meeting competition a defence to predatory pricing? The Irish Sugar decision 
suggests a new approach,” European Competition Law Review Vol. 19(1) (1998): 49–57. 
118 Eurofix-Bauco v Hilti, Decision of Commission of December 22, 1987, case COMP/30.787, [1988], O.J. 
L 65/19, see part devoted to obligations; John Ratliff, “Abuse of Dominant Position and Pricing Practices: 
A Practitioner’s Viewpoint”; in: Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu, eds., European Competition 
Law Annual 2003: What is an abuse of a dominant position? (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 
2006); Stephen Kon and Sarah Turnbull, “Pricing and the Dominant Firm: Implications of the Competition 
Commission Appeal Tribunal’s Judgment in the NAPP Case,” European Competition Law Review (2003): 
76. 
119  ECS v. AKZO-temporary measures, Decision of the European Commission of July 29, 1983, case 
COMP/30.698 [1983] O.J. L252/13, para. 38. 
120  Martin Andreas Gravengaard, “The meeting competition defence principle – a defence for price 
discrimination and predatory pricing,” European Competition Law Review Vol. 27(12) (2006). 
121 Donald Slater and Denis Waelbroeck, “Meeting Competition: Why it is not an Abuse under Article 82,” 
College of Europe Research Papers in Law (3/2004): 2; rules formulated in the practice of EU judicial 
institutions are ambiguous. Summary of judicial practice is submitted by Denis Waelbroeck, “Exclusionary 
Pricing and Price Discrimination under EC Competition Law”; in: Mads Andenas, Michael Hutchings, and 
Philip Marsden, eds., Current Competition Law, Vol. III (British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, 2005). 
122 “Commission press release IP/97/868 of 10 October 1997 on Digital Undertakings,” IP/97/868 (October 
10, 1997). 
123 Ibid. 
124 Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 115: 219. 
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In France Telecom125 case, the General Court analysed meeting competition 
defence. A France Telecom company claimed that pricing is not predatory, even if 
prices are smaller than costs, since the undertaking was coordinating its prices with 
prices of competitors and the fact that prices of competitors were smaller than costs 
of France Telecom is not relevant.126 The Commission noted that although dominant 
undertaking has a right to coordinate its prices with those of competitors, the 
undertaking is deprived of such right in case prices of undertaking are smaller than 
the costs of its goods/services. The Commission believed that prices applied by the 
France Telecom did not cover its costs; therefore, it may not coordinate prices with 
an undertaking that does not have a dominant position and intends to encourage 
sales. The General Court rejected arguments made by France Telecom and noted 
that right of the dominant undertaking to coordinate its prices with those of 
competitors is not absolute.127 In the opinion of the Court, the dominant undertaking 
has a right to protect its business interests in case they are endangered, but may not 
refer to actions, which are intended to strengthen dominant position and abuse it. 
The Court also noted that even if the dominant undertaking refers to certain 
action protecting commercial interests and alignment of prices with its competitors 
“is not in itself abusive or objectionable, it might become so where it is aimed not 
only at protecting its interests but also at strengthening and abusing its dominant 
position.”128 This decision of the General Court does not provide clear guidance 
whether dominant undertaking, which aims to protect business interests and not to 
strengthen a dominant position (or abuse it), has a right to align prices with 
competitors, if its prices are lower than average variable costs. The Court differently 
approaches cases when dominant undertaking responds to competition to protect its 
interests and when undertaking strengthens its dominant position and abuses it. 
Michal Gal believes that the present decision of the Court allows a dominant 
undertaking to rely on meeting competition defence, if it intends to protect legitimate 
interests and sets prices lower than costs.129 
European judicial institutions recognize that in predation, it is not possible to 
rely on meeting competition defence, if there is evidence that dominant undertaking 
intended to eliminate competitors.130 Moreover, in Compagnie Maritime Belge case 
the Court of Justice held that the right of the undertakings to rely on meeting 
                                         
125 France Télécom, Case T – 340/03, supra note 23. 
126 Ibid., para. 171. 
127 Ibid., para. 182. 
128 Ibid., para. 187. 
129 Michal S. Gal, “Below-cost price alignment: meeting or beating competition? The France Telecom case,” 
European Competition Law Review Vol. 28(6) (2007): 382–391. 
130 Ibid., para. 330 and 331; AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, supra note 35, para. 102, 108–109 and 
115; Tetra Pak, Case T-51/89, supra note 77, para. 147. This principle is also embedded in the case United 
Brands, supra note 70, para. 189, in which the ECJ noted that dominant undertaking cannot rely on its 
right to defend commercial interests if real aim is to strengthen dominant position and abuse it. 
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competition defence should be valued especially strictly, if their position is close to a 
monopoly.131 Although courts do pay attention to these differences, it is quite difficult 
to evaluate them precisely.132 
5.2. EFFICIENCY AND OBJECTIVE NECESSITY DEFENCES 
Commission claims that the actions of the dominant undertaking are not 
contrary to the Article 102 of the TFEU if the undertaking provides objective 
justification of its actions or proves that its actions produce efficiencies, which 
outweigh the negative effect on consumers.133 In para 74 of the ‘Guidance on the 
Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’ Commission provides that it seems 
unlikely that dominant undertaking accused of predatory pricing will be able to rely 
on efficiency defence, since it is doubtful that predatory pricing will create 
efficiencies.134 Dominant undertaking in order to rely on the efficiencies defence, 
should prove the following criteria: 1) efficiencies are/or will be achieved because of 
certain actions, for example, improvement of the quality of products; 2) certain 
actions are necessary in order to increase efficiencies, that is it is not possible to rely 
on the other, not so anti-competitive actions; 3) Increased efficiencies compensate 
negative effect on competition and consumers; 4) actions should not limit 
competition, since competition is the source of economic effectiveness.135 As we may 
conclude, conditions applied to the Article 102 of the TFEU are in essence similar to 
part 3 of the Article 101 of the TFEU.136 In Post Danmark case the Court of Justice 
explicitly held that a dominant undertaking may justify its predatory actions by 
demonstrating, either that its conduct is objectively necessary or that the 
exclusionary effect produced may be counterbalanced, outweighed even, by 
advantages in terms of efficiency that also benefit consumers.137 
The undertaking may rely on the objective necessity defence if it could prove 
that actions were objectively necessary, for example, because of security or health 
reasons related to dangerous qualities of certain products.138 According to the Court 
of Justice, dominant undertaking is not allowed to take action ex officio in order to 
                                         
131  Compagnie Maritime Belge, supra note 59, para. 119; Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly in 
Compagnie Maritime Belge SA, supra note 91. It should be noted that Compagnie Maritime Belge had 
more than 90 percent of the market. Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 115: 224. 
132 Decision of 18 February 2002, Case B-9-144/01, Federal Cartel Office. 
133 Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 115: 219. Communication from the Commission, supra note 6, 
para. 74; European Commission, DG Competition, supra note 13: para. 77. 
134 Communication from the Commission, supra note 6, para. 74. 
135 Ibid., para. 30, see also Mateus M. Abel, “Predatory pricing: a proposed structured rule of reason,” 
European Competition Journal Vol. 7, No. 2 (2011). Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 115: 225. 
136 Commission Communication – Notice – Guidelines on the application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty, OJ 
101, 27.4.2004. 
137 Post Danmark, Case C-209/10, supra note 59, para. 40-42. 
138 Communication from the Commission, supra note 7, para. 29. 
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eliminate products from the market, which are regarded by the undertaking as 
dangerous or of inferior quality in relation to its products.139 
5.3. PRODUCT INTRODUCTIONS, OBSOLETE INVENTORY AND 
INDUSTRY DOWNTURN 
It is legitimate to establish low prices while  selling obsolete products and 
vacating space for new goods.140  An undertaking may also apply especially low 
prices in order to enter the market. If prices lower than costs are applied for a short 
period, are used to advertise goods and do not cause damage for competition, such 
pricing might be recognized as economically sound even if it does not allow an 
undertaking to get maximum profit in a short time. 141  Example of objective 
justification was provided in the Press release submitted by the U.K. Competition and 
Markets Authority on 29th April of 2004. Bus Company started business in a new 
geographical market and was accused of predatory pricing. Although prices of the 
services of the bus company were lower than its costs, Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA) decided that undertaking did not breach Competition act, since there 
was evidence that undertaking intended to create a commercial background in a new 
place and did not attempt to obtrude competitor from business. CMA concluded that 
the actions of undertaking amounted to legitimate competition, period of small prices 
was beneficial for consumers and competition was not weakened.142 
The dominant undertaking may establish prices smaller than costs of certain 
goods, to encourage consumers to buy other goods for higher prices. For example, 
grocer’s shop may implement advertising campaign, during which the price of orange 
juice is lower than costs, expecting that buyers will also buy other goods. 
CONCLUSIONS 
After a review of the framework for the analysis of the predation cases, we can 
make several conclusions. 
The Court of Justice, the General Court and the Commission should not 
recognize the relationship between costs and prices of the dominant undertaking as 
a key element in predation cases. Most important is the evaluation of the effect of 
predatory pricing on competition in the market and consumers. Moreover, the 
proposal of the Commission to use average avoidable costs does not correspond to 
                                         
139 Hilti v. Commission, Case T-30/89 [1991], para. 118-119; Tetra Pak, Case T-51/89, supra note 79, 
para. 83-84 and 138. Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 115: 225. 
140 European Commission, DG Competition, supra note 13: para. 131. 
141 Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 115: 226. 
142 First Edinburgh / Lothian, Decision of the Office of Fair Trading (now CMA), No. CA98/05/2004 (April 
29, 2004) (Case CP/0361-01). Raimundas Moisejevas, supra note 115: 226. 
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the practice of the Court of Justice. The Commission should propose more clearly the 
method of calculation of average avoidable costs and long-run average incremental 
costs to increase legal certainty of undertakings. Long-run average incremental costs 
test is not universal and is applicable only in some business areas. Only in exceptional 
circumstances prices higher than average variable/avoidable costs should be illegal, 
since in this case part of fixed and all the variable costs are covered. In the present 
case, pricing of the undertaking is not as loss making as by establishment of prices 
lower than average variable/avoidable costs. Moreover, establishment of prices 
higher than average total costs by the dominant undertaking should not treated as 
predation. 
The Court of Justice, the General Court and the Commission while assessing 
predatory pricing give too much importance to the intent of the dominant 
undertaking. We believe that intention to predate should be only additional evidence 
for the determination of abuse. Strategic plans of the undertaking may provide 
evidence that undertaking aims to eliminate competitors; however, managers of 
companies do not always make the correct decisions and often do not achieve 
business goals. 
We propose recognizing that dominant undertaking referred to predatory 
pricing only if there is evidence that the dominant undertaking may recoup losses. In 
case recoupment is recognized as a necessary element, competition institutions 
would evaluate whether dominant undertakings’ actions caused damage to 
consumers. If recoupment is not considered, competition law rules might be too strict 
and dominant undertakings will not charge low prices that are beneficial for 
consumers. It is possible that such position will gain more support if private subjects 
submit more claims to dominant undertakings aiming to compensate damages 
incurred because of the application of predatory pricing. 
The position of the Commission towards objective justifications should be 
modified since conditions for the application of such defences are too strict and ill 
defined. Therefore, the ability to rely on such defences is limited. The Court of Justice 
and the General Court should recognize the right of the dominant undertaking to 
submit objective justifications of its actions in all cases, irrespective of whether prices 
applied are lower than costs. Therefore, the right of the dominant undertaking to set 
prices lower than average avoidable costs should be legal if the competitors use such 
pricing. 
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